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Introduction
• Theory of mind [3] allows people to reason about unobservable mental content of others, such as their beliefs, desires, or intentions.
• People are capable of using theory of mind recursively, and use higher-order theory of mind to reason about the theory of mind abilities of others [5].
• In strategic settings, people typically rely on zero-order or ﬁrst-order theory of mind and are slow to engage in higher-order theory of mind [1].
• The best response to an opponent following kth-order theory of mind is to reason at (k + 1)st-order theory of mind [6].
Experiment
The Mod game [2] is an extension of rock-paper-
scissors. In our experiment, two players each
choose a number between 1 and 24.
Players score a point if they chose the number
that is exactly one higher than the number cho-
sen by their opponent. In addition, players that
choose the number 1 score a point if their oppo-
nent has chosen number 24.
Participants knowingly play Mod games against
a ToM1 agent, a ToM2 agent, a ToM3 agent,
and a randomizing agent that randomly switches
between these three options every round.
• Blocks of 20 rounds per opponent
• Each opponent appeared in two blocks
Results and discussion
We used random-eﬀects Bayesian model selection (RFX-BMS, [4]) to determine the level of theory of mind reasoning of the participants playing the Mod
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• RFX-BMS accurately recovered the level of theory of mind reasoning of theory of mind agents (green, blue, and purple bars in left ﬁgure).
• RFX-BMS is unable to classify the randomizing agent (red bars in left ﬁgure).
• Participants adjust their level of theory of mind reasoning to their opponent:
 When playing against a ToM1 opponent, participants are best explained as using ﬁrst-order or second-order theory of mind (green bars, right ﬁgure).
 When playing against a ToM3 opponent, participants rely on third-order or fourth-order theory of mind (purple bars, right ﬁgure).
 Participants that play against the randomizing agent are better explained as using simple, behavior-based strategies (red bars, right ﬁgure).
• Surprisingly, participant behavior shows evidence of fourth-order theory of mind reasoning (purple bars, right ﬁgure). This is much higher than would
be expected based on the literature.
Random-effects Bayesian model selection
To classify participant behavior, we make use of random-eﬀects Bayesian model selection [4]. In this
analysis, we distinguish the following strategies to play the Mod game.
Behavior-based strategies
• The k-self-regarding strategy selects the num-
ber that is k higher than the number chosen
in the last round with some ﬁxed probability.
• The k-other-regarding strategy selects the
number that is k higher than the number the
opponent chose in the last round with some
ﬁxed probability.
• The win-stay lose-shift strategy selects the
same number as chosen in the last round if
that number led to a victory, and otherwise
randomly picks another number.
Theory of mind strategies [6]
• The zero-order theory of mind ToM0 strategy
predicts that if the opponent chooses number
n, it is likely that the opponent will play num-
ber n again in the future.
• The ﬁrst-order theory of mind ToM1 strategy
extends the ToM0 strategy with the possibil-
ity that the opponent follows a ToM0 strategy.
• The kth-order theory of mind ToMk strategy
attributes all lower order of theory of mind
strategies to his opponent.
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